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1Abstract
A ﬁctitious play algorithm with a unit memory length within an
evolutionary environment is considered. The aggregate average behav-
ior model is proposed and analyzed. The existence, uniqueness and
global asymptotic stability of equilibrium is proved for games with a
cycling property. Also, a noisy version of the algorithm is considered,
which gives rise to a system with a unique, globally asymptotically
stable equilibrium for any game.
21 Introduction
A ﬁctitious play algorithm with ever growing memory, denoted FP(∞), was
introduce in [Bro51]. Once a memory of FP(∞) is truncated, the class of
ﬁnite ﬁctitious play algorithms is obtained. The ﬁctitious play algorithm with
a memory of length M is denoted FP(M). In this paper we specialize even
further and consider a naive ﬁctitious play algorithm, i.e. a ﬁnite memory
ﬁctitious play algorithm with a unit length, FP(1).
The naive ﬁctitious play algorithm is a well known best-reply algorithm
used, among others, in a Cournot’s duopoly model, cf. [FL98, MWG95]. It
also gave rise to best-reply dynamics1 of the form ˙ x = β(x) − x, where β(·)
is a best-reply correspondence.
We analyze the FP(1) algorithm in an evolutionary environment with
micro-inertia. Therefore, the information available to players is distributed,
heterogeneous and delayed. We investigate aggregate average behavior of
such a population of players, also with noise.
Section 2 gives details of the underlying multi-agent model. Section 3
provides a model of aggregate average behavior of a population of players
using the FP(1) algorithm. Equilibrium is deﬁned and studied in Section 4.
Section 5 is concerned with dynamic properties of a system and contains
results on uniqueness and asymptotic stability of equilibrium. A noisy version
of FP(1) algorithm is studied in Section 6. Finally, a continuous time limit
of dynamics is considered in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8.
2 Multi-agent model
We consider only normal form games. A game is a triple (I,S,G), where I
is a set of players, S = {1,...,S} is a set of pure strategies and G is a payoﬀ
function.
1In fact, it is diﬀerential inclusion.
3These games are played within a certain environment. We are concerned
with an evolutionary-like single population environment only. That is, we
assume the following properties of the environment. Firstly, there are only
bilateral interactions in the environment and these interactions are random,
i.e. players are matched into pairs at random. Secondly, the environment is
fully anonymous, i.e. players are anonymous to each other and to the envi-
ronment (in particular no speciﬁc information is available to the environment
while creating random pairs). Finally, we assume micro-inertia, a feature we
deﬁne and discuss later on.
All the above assumptions restrict the set of games we are interested
in. Namely, we are concerned two-player symmetric normal form games.
Therefore, we have I = {1,2} and a payoﬀ function may be summarized as a
matrix G = {gij}. We do not make any assumptions on the number of pure
strategies except that it is a ﬁnite number.
The system comprises N > 2 players. At each round t ∈ N only K players
are chosen to play a game. It is assumed that K is an even number such that
K < N. The probability that a given player is chosen to play in a round
is K/N.
We refer to the assumption K < N as micro-inertia. Even if K = N,
there may be some inertia at the aggregate level. Although it is still possible,
it is not so in general. The assumption that K < N excludes the possibility
of extremely rapid shifts of the whole population.
Each player uses the extreme version of ﬁnite memory ﬁctitious play, i.e.
we assume that a player remembers only the last strategy he has played
against (or that a memory has a unit length). This algorithm is the well
known best-reply algorithm (as in Cournot duopoly model, cf. [FL98]). Be-
cause of the evolutionary nature of the environment, the information available
to players is heterogeneous and delayed.
43 Model of average behavior
The model of average behavior consists of a Markov chain describing the
evolution of players’ histories and an operator providing a distribution of
strategies given a distribution of histories. This in turn, deﬁnes transition
probabilities of histories, and so on. The model of evolution of a distribution
of histories µ ∈ 4S is the most simple version of a de Bruijn graph, where the
set of nodes is just S and transition probabilities are given by P(x), where
x ∈ 4S is the distribution of strategies in a population.
Deﬁnition 1 For any x ∈ 4S the transition matrix P(x) is given by
P(x) =

1 −
K
N

IS +
K
N



x1 ··· xS
. . .
. . .
x1 ··· xS


,
where IS is an S × S identity matrix.
Once a distribution of histories µ is given, a distribution of strategies x
is determined through a best-reply correspondence.
Deﬁnition 2 The matrix H = [hij] is deﬁned through a best-reply correspon-
dence, i.e. hij is the probability of playing the j-th pure strategy if the i-th
pure strategy was observed.
The matrix H is a stochastic matrix with a very speciﬁc structure. If
BR(i) = {j} then hij = 1 and hij0 = 0 for all j0 6= j. If BR(i) is not a
singleton then we have a uniform distribution on a set BR(i).
Example 1 Consider a game with a payoﬀ matrix G
G =

a 0
0 b

,
where a,b > 0. The best-reply matrix H is given by
H =

1 0
0 1

,
5regardless of any particular values of a and b.
Example 2 Consider a game with a payoﬀ matrix G
G =

0 a
0 b

,
where a < b. The best-reply matrix H is given by
H =

1/2 1/2
0 1

,
regardless of any particular values of a and b.
The evolution of the system is described through a system of equations:
µ
T
t+1 = µ
T
t P(xt), (1)
x
T
t+1 = µ
T
t+1H, (2)
where µ0 is a given initial condition. The ﬁrst equation provides the deﬁnition
of evolution, while the second one is an equilibrium condition. It is clear that
the system (1)–(2) is well deﬁned, i.e. for any t, (µt,xt) ∈ 4S × 4S.
4 Equilibrium
Having described the evolution of the system we deﬁne its equilibrium as any
ﬁxed point of the dynamics (1)–(2).
Deﬁnition 3 A pair (µe,xe) is an equilibrium if and only if it is a ﬁxed point
of the dynamics (1)–(2), i.e. it satisﬁes the following system of equations
µ
T
e = µ
T
e P(xe), (3)
x
T
e = µ
T
e H. (4)
The set of all equilibria of a game is denoted 4FP(1).
Proposition 1 For any two-player symmetric game (I,S,G) there exists an
FP(1)-equilibrium, i.e. 4FP(1) 6= ∅.
6Proof. The function
4S × 4S 3

µ
x

7→

µTP(x)
µTH

∈ 4S × 4S
is continuous and deﬁned on a compact and convex set 4S ×4S. Hence, by
Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem, there exists an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 For any two-player symmetric game (I,S,G), the set of all
equilibrium distributions of strategies is an intersection of a simplex 4S and
a kernel of linear operator H−I, i.e. it is given by a system of linear equalities
x
T = x
TH ∧ hx|1i = 1, (5)
where 1 is a vector of ones.
Proof. The second equation, hx|1i = 1, is obvious. Suppose (µ,x) ∈ 4FP(1).
Using (3), we have
µ
T = µ
TP(x) = µ
T




1 −
K
N

IS +
K
N



x1 ··· xS
. . .
. . .
x1 ··· xS






=

1 −
K
N

µ
T +
K
N
x
T.
Therefore, at any equilibrium, there is µ = x. Substituting µ with x in (4)
yields the result.
The above proposition is quite revealing. The equilibrium does not de-
pend on the size of the system, N, or the micro-inertia K/N. The only
element deﬁning an equilibrium is a best-reply matrix. The structure of
the set of FP(1)-equilibria is linear, i.e. there is a unique equilibrium or a
continuum number of equilibria2. This set is always compact and convex.
2Even if there is a continuum number of equilibria, it does not mean that any distri-
bution is an equilibrium. This depends on the dimension of a kernel of H − I.
7The convexity of the set of FP(1)-equilibria clearly prevents this concept
from being anything like the concept of Nash equilibrium. We have the
following examples.
Example 3 Consider the game from Example 1. It is trivial to see that
4FP(1) = 42 × 42, and so any distribution x is an FP(1)-equilibrium, re-
gardless of values a,b > 0.
Example 4 Consider a game with a payoﬀ matrix G
G =

0 a
b 0

,
where a,b > 0. The best-reply matrix H is given by
H =

0 1
1 0

,
regardless of any particular values of a and b. The only distribution x satis-
fying system (5) is xT
e = (1/2,1/2), which is not a Nash equilibrium.
5 Dynamics
We start with a derivation of dynamics in terms of the distribution of histo-
ries µ. We have
µ
T
t+1 = µ
T
t P(xt) =

1 −
K
N

µ
T
t +
K
N
x
T
t
=

1 −
K
N

µ
T
t +
K
N
µ
T
t H
= µ
T
t

1 −
K
N

IS +
K
N
H

= µ
T
t Ψ.
In a similar way, we have
x
T
t+1 = µ
T
t+1H =

1 −
K
N

µ
T
t +
K
N
x
T
t

H
=

1 −
K
N

x
T
t +
K
N
x
T
t H
= x
T
t

1 −
K
N

IS +
K
N
H

= x
T
t Ψ.
8The matrix Ψ is a stochastic matrix.
Consider a two-player symmetric game (I,S,G) with a payoﬀ matrix G
and a set of pure strategies S = {1,...,S}. The matrix Ψ deﬁnes a directed
graph, denoted H, with a set of nodes S and a set of eges E. A pair (i,j) ∈ E
if and only if j ∈ BR(i). Together with the probabilities deﬁned in Ψ, the
graph H is a homogeneous Markov chain.
Proposition 3 For any two-player symmetric game (I,S,G) the sequence
xt converges to a set 4FP(1) of all FP(1)-equilibria.
Proof. The set of states S of a Markov chain Ψ can be partitioned, cf. [GS01,
Bre99], into a union of a set of transient states and irreducible blocks. Each
of the irreducible blocks is ergodic, since it is also aperiodic and positive
recurrent. Therefore, the sequence of measures xt will converge to a measure
that satisﬁes xT = xTΨ, hence xT = xTH.
Proposition 4 For any two-player symmetric game (I,S,G) a set of tran-
sient states of a Markov chain Ψ is equal to a set of pure strategies removed
in a course of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. In particular, if
a game is solvable by an iterated elimination of dominated strategies, there
is a unique globally asymptotically stable equilibrium which corresponds to a
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Clearly, if a strategy i is removed in an iterated elimination of domi-
nated strategies, it is a best reply only to strategies that are removed before.
Working backwards, we end up with strategies that are removed as the ﬁrst
ones, i.e. they are not a best reply to any strategy (there are no incoming
edges to these states). Therefore, the strategy i cannot be recurrent. If a
strategy i is transient, it means there is no path from i back to i, that is i is
removed by an iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
9If a game is solvable by an iterated elimination of dominated strategies,
there is a single recurrent state i. Clearly, xt,i → 1. Also, it has to be a Nash
equilibrium, since {i} = BR(i).
We say that a game (I,S,G) has a cycling property if the graph H con-
tains a cycle comprising all nodes.
Proposition 5 If a two-player symmetric game (I,S,G) has a cycling
property, then there exists the unique globally asymptotically stable FP(1)-
equilibrium xe ∈ int(4S).
Proof. Clearly, if a game has a cycling property, then a best-reply matrix
H is irreducible. Therefore, a matrix Ψ is irreducible, aperiodic and posi-
tive recurrent, hence ergodic. It follows that there is the unique stationary
measure µe that charges all states and for any initial measure µ0, a sequence
µT
t+1 = µT
t Ψ converges to this stationary measure.
Proposition 5 says that any game with a cycling property fancies a unique
globally asymptotically stable equilibrium. It is the very same property that
allows construction of classical non-convergent ﬁctitious play examples in
an environment with two players. The most well-known examples are the
following.
Example 5 Consider a game with a payoﬀ matrix G, cf. [FK93],
G =

0 a
b 0

,
where a,b > 0. This game has a cycling property since {2} = BR(1), and
{1} = BR(2). Therefore, there is the unique globally asymptotically stable
FP(1)-equilibrium, which is xT
e = (1/2,1/2), cf. Example 4.
Example 6 Consider a game with a payoﬀ matrix G, cf. [Sha64, Wei96, FL98],
G =


0 a 0
0 0 b
c 0 0

,
10where a,b,c > 0. We have BR(1) = {3}, BR(3) = {2} and BR(2) = {1},
hence this game has a cycling property. The unique globally asymptotically
stable equilibrium, regardless of particular values of parameters a, b and c,
is xT
e = (1/3,1/3,1/3).
Example 7 Consider a game with a payoﬀ matrix G, cf. [HS98],
G =

 

0 0 −1 a
a 0 0 −1
−1 a 0 0
0 −1 a 0

 
,
where a ∈ R. Graphs H for diﬀerent values of a are depicted in Figure 1. In
all cases this game has a cycling property. The unique globally asymptotically
stable equilibrium, regardless of a particular value of parameter a, is xT
e =
(1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4).
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
Figure 1: Graphs H for a game proposed in [HS98] for (from left to right)
a < 0, a = 0 and a > 0.
6 Noisy naive ﬁctitious play
We consider two ways of introducing noise into the system. Noise can enter
the system through best-reply choices of players, i.e. a player chooses a best
reply with high probability and uniform noise over S with small probability.
Alternatively, a player can have a noisy observations, i.e. a player observes
a correct history with large probability, or uniform noise over S with small
probability.
11If noise is introduced through a best-reply correspondence, it is necessary
to modify the best-reply matrix H. We introduce a new noisy best-reply
matrix H as follows
H = (1 − )H + 
1
S



1 ··· 1
. . .
. . .
1 ··· 1


.
The noisy dynamics is the same dynamics as (1)-(2) with H substituted for
H, i.e. we have
µ
T
t+1 = µ
T
t P(xt), (6)
x
T
t+1 = µ
T
t+1H. (7)
If noise is introduced through observations, it is necessary to modify the
transition matrix P. We introduce a new noisy transition matrix P as follows
P(x) =

1 −
K
N

IS +
K
N


(1 − )



x1 ··· xS
. . .
. . .
x1 ··· xS


 + 
1
S



1 ··· 1
. . .
. . .
1 ··· 1





.
The noisy dynamics is the same dynamics as (1)-(2) with P substituted for
P, i.e. we have
µ
T
t+1 = µ
T
t P(xt), (8)
x
T
t+1 = µ
T
t+1H. (9)
We deﬁne a noisy FP(1)-equilbrium as any ﬁxed point of either the system
(6)-(7) or the system (8)-(9). This does not cause any problems since we have
the following.
For the system (6)-(7)
µ
T
t+1 = µ
T
t P(xt) =

1 −
K
N

µ
T
t +
K
N
x
T
t
=

1 −
K
N

µ
T
t +
K
N
µ
T
t H
= µ
T
t

1 −
K
N

IS +
K
N
H

= µ
T
t Ψ.
12For the system (8)-(9)
µ
T
t+1 = µ
T
t P(xt) =
=

1 −
K
N

µ
T
t +
K
N


(1 − )µ
T
t H + µ
T
t
1
S



1 ··· 1
. . .
. . .
1 ··· 1






= µ
T
t

1 −
K
N

IS +
K
N
H

= µ
T
t Ψ.
In both cases we can repeat the same derivation for xt and get xT
t+1 =
xT
t Ψ. The matrix Ψ can be rewritten as
Ψ =

1 −
K
N

IS +
K
N


(1 − )H + 
1
S



1 ··· 1
. . .
. . .
1 ··· 1





.
Clearly, as  converges to 0, the operator Ψ converges to Ψ.
Proposition 6 For any two-player symmetric game (I,S,G) and any
 ∈ (0,1] there exists a unique globally asymptotically stable noisy FP(1)-
equilibrium.
Proof. For any game and any  ∈ (0,1], the matrix Ψ is irreducible, aperiodic
and positive recurrent. Therefore, there exists a unique stationary measure
xe, and a sequence xt converges to xe.
Proposition 2 holds for a noisy version of the FP(1)-equilibrium, i.e. any
noisy FP(1)-equilibrium has to satisﬁes a system of linear equations
x
T = x
TH ∧ hx|1i = 1,
where the ﬁrst equation can be further rewritten as
x
T = (1 − )x
TH + 
1
S
1.
A noisy version of FP(1)-equilibrium is a mixture of a simple FP(1)-
equilibrium and uniform noise.
13Since as  converges to 0 the noisy equilibrium converges to a simple equi-
librium, it can be thought of as a selecting device between diﬀerent FP(1)-
equilibria.
Example 8 Consider a game from Example 1. The system of equations
deﬁning a noisy FP(1)-equilibrium reads
x1 − x2 = 0 ∧ x1 + x2 = 1,
regardless of values of a,b > 0 and . The unique globally asymptotically
stable equilibrium is xe = 1/2,1/2.
7 Continuous time limit
Suppose that during a time interval 4t the probability of a player being
active p(4t) is proportional to the time interval 4t, i.e. p(4t) = λ4t +
o(4t), where λ is intensity of play. We then have
P(x,4t) = (1 − p(4t))IS + p(4t)



x1 ··· xS
. . .
. . .
x1 ··· xS


,
which leads to
x
T
t+4t − x
T
t = p(4t)x
T (H − IS).
Dividing by 4t and taking the limit as 4t → 0 we obtain a system of linear
ﬁrst order diﬀerential equations
˙ x
T = λ x
T (H − IS). (10)
The dynamics (10) is well deﬁned, i.e. a simplex 4S is forward invariant
under the dynamics (10). First, we have
h˙ x|1i =


λ x
T (H − IS)|1

= λ


x
TH|1

− λ


x
TIS|1

= λ − λ = 0.
Second, suppose some xl = 0. But then the ˙ xl ≥ 0 because the only negative
elements in a matrix H − IS are on a diagonal. Also, if some xl = 1 then
˙ xl ≤ 0.
14In a similar fashion we can derive a continuous time version of noisy
FP(1) dynamics
˙ x
T = λ x
T (H − IS)
= λ x
T (H − IS) + λ x
T



1
S



1 ··· 1
. . .
. . .
1 ··· 1


 − H


.
Clearly, as  → 0 the noisy dynamics converges to the dynamics (10).
Example 9 Consider a game from the Example 1. The noisy continuous time
version of FP(1) dynamics reads
˙ x1 = 
K
2N
(1 − 2x1).
Regardless of values a,b > 0, N > K > 2 or a noise level  ∈ (0,1) the
unique globally asymptotically stable equilibrium is xe = (1/2,1/2).
Example 10 Consider a game from the Example 7 with a > 0. The noisy
continuous time version of FP(1) dynamics reads
˙ x1 =
K(4x3 − 4x3 + 4x1( − 2) + 4x2( − 1) − 3 + 4)
4N
,
˙ x2 =
K(−4x2 − 4x1( − 1) + )
4N
,
˙ x3 =
K(−4x3 − 4x2( − 1) + )
4N
.
Regardless of values a > 0, N > K > 2 or a noise level  ∈ (0,1) the unique
globally asymptotically stable equilibrium is xe = (1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4).
8 Conclusions
We derived a model of aggregate behavior of a population of players using
naive ﬁctitious play in an evolutionary environment. The derived model is
diﬀerent from the best-reply dynamics, cf. [HS98]. Rather, it is reminiscent
of the concept of a sampling equilibrium, cf. [OR98].
15The FP(1)-equilibria, deﬁned as ﬁxed points of the derived dynamics,
exist for any two-player symmetric game3. The set 4FP(1) of all FP(1)-
equilibria has a simple linear structure, i.e. 4FP(1) = ker(H − I) ∩ 4S .
Therefore, it is convex and compact.
The dynamics always converges to the set 4FP(1). If a game has the
cycling property, there is a unique globally asymptotically stable FP(1)-
equilibrium. It is interesting that it is exactly this property that allowed
to build classical non-convergence examples, cf. [FK93, Sha64, HS98, FY98].
The noisy version of the model provides the uniqueness and global asymp-
totic stability of an equilibrium, regardless of the considered game. Since,
as the noise level disappears, the noisy dynamics converges to the simple
FP(1) dynamics, the noisy dynamics may be considered a selecting device
among many FP(1)-equilibria.
We provide also a continuous time versions of FP(1) dynamics with and
without noise. The continuous time versions are simple systems of linear ﬁrst
order diﬀerential equations. This is diﬀerent from replicator dynamics, which
is quadratic, and best-reply dynamics, which in fact is diﬀerential inclusion.
Further research is required to study and understand ﬁctitious play al-
gorithms with longer but still ﬁnite memories within the evolutionary en-
vironment. However, the future research should proceed along the paths
developed herein.
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